We study a two-stage sequential search model with two agents who compete for one job. The agents arrive sequentially, each one in a di¤erent stage. The agents'abilities are private information and they are derived from heterogeneous distribution functions. In each stage the designer chooses an ability threshold. If an agent has a higher ability than the ability threshold in the stage in which he arrives, he gets the job and the search is over. We analyze the equilibrium ability thresholds imposed by the designer who wishes to maximize the ability of the agent who gets the job minus the search cost. We also investigate the ratio of the equilibrium ability thresholds as well as the optimal allocation of agents in both stages according to the agents'distributions of abilities.
Introduction
The problem of assigning various items of two di¤erent groups which are not necessarily of the same size such as a group of agents to a group of jobs have been studied in numerous frameworks. In his classical model, Derman et al. (1972) considered n agents who are available to perform n jobs which arrive in a sequential order. The designer has to decide whether to assign the job at all, and if so, which of the n agents to assign it to. However, an agent can be assigned to a job only once. The goal of the designer is to maximize the expected total return, where the return from an allocation of job j to agent k is the product of the value of the job j and the value (ability) of the agent k. It is assumed that the agents' values are commonly known but the jobs'values are random variables. Later, Albright (1974) focused on a continuous time framework where the number of agents is …xed but the jobs arrive randomly according to a continuous scholastic process. In the latter two models the agents' values are common knowledge. Mussa and Rosen (1978) , on the other hand, considered a static model of a monopolistic seller who decides on a price function that depends on the quality of the product for sale when he does not know the agents' values for these products, but does know their distribution. Similarly, Segal (2003) studied a monopolistic seller who faces n buyers, each of whom has unit demand and private information for the unit being sold, and the seller does not know the buyers'valuations nor their distribution. A dynamic model where the agents arrive by a stochastic process was studied by Gershkov and Moldovanu (2009a) . Using mechanism design tools, they derived a revenue maximization policy in continuous time frameworks under the assumptions that agents'
valuations are drawn by a distribution function that is known to the seller and is identical for all agents. In later works, Moldovanu (2009b, 2012 ) applied a discrete time framework where they assumed that the agents'values are private information and even their distributions are unknown to the designer.
In all the above assignment models, as well as various others in the literature, it was assumed that the agents'types under incomplete information, whether their distribution is known or unknown, are symmetric; namely, each type is derived from the same distribution function. In this paper we study a very simple model of assignment in which the agents'types are under incomplete information and are not derived from the same distribution function. To put it formally, in the model, two agents compete for one job. The agents arrive sequentially one after the other. The designer wishes to give the job to the agent with the highest ability.
He does not know the agents'abilities, but does know their distribution functions which are heterogeneous.
In the …rst stage, the designer decides an ability threshold. Then, the …rst agent arrives and if his ability is higher than or equal to the ability threshold imposed by the designer he wins the job and the sequential search is over. Otherwise, in the second stage the designer again imposes an ability threshold which is not necessarily equal to the previous one. Then, the second agent arrives, and if his ability is higher than or equal to the second ability threshold, he wins the job. If, on the other hand, the second agent's ability is lower than the designer's ability threshold, no one wins the job and the payo¤ of the designer is negative and equals 2c where c is his cost of the search in each stage. The goal of the designer is to maximize his expected payo¤ which is equal to a monotonic function of the expected ability of the agent who gets the job minus his cost of the search.
We begin the analysis by examining the e¤ect of time on the designer's strategies; namely, we investigate the ratio of the ability thresholds imposed by the designer in the two stages of the sequential search. We particularly address the following questions: Is it true that these ability thresholds decrease along the stages of the sequential search? How does the asymmetry of the agents a¤ect the ratio of the ability thresholds they need to face? In order to answer these questions we say that agent 1 is stronger than agent 2 if the distribution of agent 1's ability stochastically dominates his opponent's distribution of ability in terms of the hazard rate.
Then we show that, if the agent who arrives in the …rst stage is stronger than the agent who arrives in the second stage, regardless of the value of the designer's search cost c; in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium the stronger agent in the …rst period faces a higher ability threshold than his opponent in the second stage.
However, in the opposite case when the stronger agent arrives in the second stage, if the designer's cost c is su¢ ciently high then the stronger agent in the second stage may face a lower ability threshold than his opponent. If, on the other hand, the search cost c is su¢ ciently small, although the stronger agent arrives in the second stage, his weaker opponent in the …rst stage faces a higher ability threshold.
We also compare the equilibrium ability thresholds in two di¤erent sequential search models. We show that if the agent in each stage of the sequential search A is stronger than the agent in the same stage of the sequential search B, then the equilibrium ability threshold in each stage of the sequential search A is higher than the equilibrium ability threshold in the same stage of the sequential search B. We also show that if the agent in each stage of the sequential search A is stronger than the agent in the same stage of the sequential search B, and also that the stronger agent in each sequential search arrives in the …rst stage, then the designer's expected payo¤ in the sequential search A is larger than in the sequential search B.
We then deal with the question of what the optimal order of agents is for the designer who wishes to maximize his expected payo¤ which is equal to the expected ability of the agent who gets the job minus the cost of the search. We …rst show that in our sequential search model if the designer has to impose the same ability threshold in both stages then the stronger player should be allocated in the …rst stage. In the case that the designer is allowed to impose di¤erent ability thresholds in both stages of the sequential search, we provide su¢ cient conditions such that the stronger player should be allocated in the …rst stage of the sequential search.
The literature of economic theory under incomplete information has dealt mostly with symmetric agents where their types are derived from the same distribution function which is common knowledge. In many cases, however, agents' types are drawn from di¤erent distribution functions which makes it hard to deal with these models particularly when the agents act simultaneously. Although explicit expressions for such asymmetric equilibrium strategies cannot be obtained other than for very simple models, we can …nd some 
The model
We consider a two-stage sequential search with two agents who compete to win one job. The agents'valuation for winning the job is normalized to 1. We denote by a i 0 the ability (or type) of agent i; i = 1; 2 which is private information to i. Agent i's ability is independently drawn from the interval [0; 1] according to a distribution function F i which is common knowledge. We assume that F i has a positive and continuous density function F 
or to any other monotonic increasing function of d i . In the case that no agent wins the job, the designer's expected payo¤ is P 2 j=1 c j .
The equilibrium ability thresholds
In order to analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the model, we begin with the second stage of the sequential search and go backwards to the previous stage. The designer's maximization problem in stage 2
Thus, the equilibrium ability threshold in stage 2; d 2 ; is given by
The designer's maximization problem in stage 1 is then
where d 2 is the equilibrium ability threshold in stage 2: The equilibrium ability threshold in stage 1; d 1 is then given by
We assume that the maximization problems (3) and (1) have a solution. 1 The solution (d 1 ; d 2 ) of equations (4) and (2) provides the equilibrium ability thresholds imposed by the designer. Note that these equations are the necessary conditions for the optimal ability threshold, and therefore the optimal ability thresholds are also equilibrium ability thresholds. The following example illustrates the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in our sequential search model.
Example 1
Suppose that the players'abilities are distributed according to
Then, the designers's maximization problem in the second stage is
By (2), the F.O.C. is
The designer's maximization problem in the …rst stage is
By (4), the F.O.C. is
The designer's expected payo¤ is given by
The following …gure presents the designer's expected payo¤ . In order to proceed we need the following de…nition. Let F and G be two distribution functions with
, we say that F stochastically dominates G in terms of the hazard rate. Then, if player i's ability is distributed according to F i , i = 1; 2; and F 1 stochastically dominates F 2 in terms of the hazard rate, we say that agent 1 is stronger than agent 2.
The following result demonstrates that if the agent who arrives in the …rst stage is stronger than the agent who arrives in the second stage, then the stronger agent in the …rst stage has to face a higher ability threshold than the weaker agent in the second stage. Proof. The equilibrium ability threshold in the second stage is determined by
while the equilibrium e¤ort threshold in the …rst stage is determined by
Inserting (5) in (6) yields
where F1 (a) and F2 (a) are the hazard rates of F 1 and F 2 , respectively. We assume that F 1 stochastically dominates F 2 in terms of the hazard rate which implies that
1 and therefore we have that
The last inequality holds since otherwise the designer has no incentive to act in the second stage. Thus, G(d 2 ) 0, and since G(d 1 ) = 0 and G 0 < 0, we obtain that the equilibrium ability thresholds satisfy
The result of Proposition 1 implies that if both agents have the same distribution of ability, i.e., F 1 = F 2 ; the equilibrium ability threshold in the …rst stage d 1 is higher than or equal to the equilibrium ability threshold in the second stage d 2 . The next result shows that when agent 1 is not stronger than agent 2, the equilibrium ability threshold that the weaker agent (agent 1) faces in the …rst stage might be either higher or lower than the equilibrium ability threshold that the stronger agent (agent 2) faces in the second stage. Proof. By (6) and (7) the equilibrium ability thresholds satisfy
) c is su¢ ciently small we obtain that G(d 2 ) < 0; and since
On the other hand, if
F 2 (a) and c is su¢ ciently small, we obtain that
The following example illustrates the result obtained in Proposition 2.
dominates F 1 in terms of the hazard rate. We will show that although the stronger agent arrives in the second stage, the equilibrium ability threshold in the …rst stage is higher than in the second stage. In that case we have that
By Proposition 2, in order to show that the equilibrium ability threshold in the second stage is higher than in the …rst stage, it is su¢ cient to show that for all 0 x 1,
or, alternatively, we need to show that
For x = 1, both sides of the last inequality are the same. The derivative of the LHS is
and the derivative of the RHS is
Since for every 0 x 1 there exists x k+m 1 < x k 1 , we obtain that m + kx
Thus far we have compared the equilibrium ability thresholds of the same sequential search model. Now we wish to compare the equilibrium ability thresholds of two di¤erent sequential search models. Proof. By (2) we have the following conditions
Proposition 3 Let (d
Rearranging implies that
Since F 2 stochastically dominates G 2 in terms of the hazard rate,
and, in particular,
we have that
By the S.O.C. of the maximization problem (1) we obtain that L F (d) and L G (d) are decreasing functions, and therefore by (8) in order to obtain the equality
Similarly, by (4) we have the following conditions
we obtain that
Since F 1 stochastically dominates G 1 in terms of the hazard rate,
and, in particular, we have that
By the S.O.C. of the maximization problem (3) we obtain that M F (d) and M G (d) are decreasing functions, and therefore by (9) in order to obtain the equality M F (d
In the following, using the above results concerning the ratio of the equilibrium ability thresholds, we
show that if the agent in each stage of sequential search A is stronger than the agent at the same stage of sequential search B, and the stronger agent of the sequential search B arrives in the …rst stage, then the designer's optimal expected payo¤ in the sequential search A is higher than in the sequential search B.
Proposition 4 Suppose that F i ; i = 1; 2 stochastically dominates G i ; i = 1; 2 in terms of the hazard rate, and G 1 stochastically dominates G 2 in terms of the hazard rate as well. Then, in the sequential search with the distribution functions F i ; i = 1; 2 the designer's optimal expected payo¤ is higher than in the sequential search with the distribution functions G i ; i = 1; 2.
2 ) be the optimal ability thresholds when the distribution functions are F i ; i = 1; 2,
) be the optimal ability thresholds when the distribution functions are G i ; i = 1; 2. We wish to
show that
Since the optimal ability thresholds satisfy equations (4) and (2), by Proposition 1 we have that d
Thus, it is su¢ cient to show that for all
or, alternatively, that
Since
and, in particular, that the LHS of (10) is always positive. On the other hand,
and therefore the RHS of (10) is negative. Hence, the inequality (10) holds.
The optimal order of agents
In this section we examine how the order of agents a¤ects the designer's expected payo¤. Assume …rst that the contest designer has a limitation according to which the ability thresholds have to be the same in both stages although the agents have asymmetric distributions of abilities. Then, if the designer has to choose the same ability threshold independent of the order of agents we obtain that Proposition 5 If the designer imposes the same ability threshold in both stages and the distribution function of player 1's ability F 1 stochastically dominates the distribution function of player 2's ability F 2 in terms of the hazard rate, then the designer maximizes his expected payo¤ when player 1 is allocated in the …rst stage and player 2 in the second one.
Proof. It is su¢ cient to show that for every 0 d 1
Note that (11) is satis…ed.
For Proposition 5 it was su¢ cient to assume that F 1 …rst-order stochastically dominates F 2 ; i.e., for all x, F 1 (x) F 2 (x): Note that the fact that F 1 stochastically dominates F 2 in terms of the hazard rate implies that F 1 …rst-order stochastically dominates F 2 : Assume now that the designer has to choose the same ability threshold independent of the order of agents where this ability threshold is equal to the equilibrium ability threshold of the second stage. Then, in contrast to Proposition 5, the following result shows that the stronger player should be allocated in the second stage.
Proposition 6
Assume that the cost of search c is su¢ ciently small and the designer imposes in both stages the equilibrium ability threshold of the second stage. Then, if the distribution function of player 1's ability F 1 stochastically dominates the distribution function of player 2's ability F 2 in terms of the hazard rate, the designer maximizes his expected payo¤ when player 1 is allocated in the second stage and player 2 in the …rst one.
Proof. Let d 1 be the ability threshold for both stages when player 1 is allocated in the second stage and d 2 be the ability threshold for both stages when player 2 is allocated in the second stage. We wish to show
Assume that c = 0: Then we need to show that
…rst-order stochastically dominates both F 1 and F 2 ;
and F 1 stochastically dominates F 2 we obtain that
For Proposition 6 it was also su¢ cient to assume that F 1 …rst-order stochastically dominates F 2 . We now give the designer the freedom to choose di¤erent ability thresholds that depend on the agents'distributions of abilities. Then, we have su¢ cient conditions that the stronger player should be allocated in the …rst stage of the sequential search.
Proposition 7
Assume that the distribution function of player 1's ability F 1 stochastically dominates the distribution function of player 2's ability F 2 in terms of the hazard rate. Then, if the search cost c is su¢ ciently small and
the designer maximizes his expected payo¤ when he allocates player 1 in the …rst stage.
Proof. Let ( e d 1 ; e d 2 ) be the equilibrium ability thresholds when player 1 is allocated in the …rst stage,
be the equilibrium ability thresholds when player 2 is allocated in the …rst stage. We wish to show that in order to maximize his expected payo¤ the designer should allocate player 1 in the …rst stage and player 2 in the second one. Thus, we need to show that
By Proposition 2, since
F 1 (x) and c is su¢ ciently small, then b
Thus, it is enough to show
Since F 1 stochastically dominates F 2 in terms of the hazard rate the last inequality holds.
The result of Proposition 7 is illustrated in the following example.
Example 3 Suppose that F 1 (x) = x k ,F 2 (x) = x m ; k > m 1, and c = 0. Then, by Proposition 7, player 1 should be allocated in the …rst stage if
This condition can be expressed as
and it is equivalent to
Therefore it is enough to show that m(1 x k ) < k(1 x m )
For x = 1, both sides of the last inequality are the same. The derivative of the LHS is kmx k 1 and the derivative of the RHS is kmx m 1 : Since kmx k 1 > kmx m 1 the inequality (14) is satis…ed.
It is important to note that Proposition 7 provides a su¢ cient condition but not a necessary one for allocating the stronger agent in the …rst stage and the weaker agent in the second one. Allocating the stronger agent in the …rst stage most probably holds for a signi…cantly larger group of distribution functions than the group determined by our su¢ cient condition.
Concluding remarks
We studied a two-stage sequential search with two agents who compete for one job. We assumed that the agents are ex-ante asymmetric, namely, their abilities are derived from asymmetric distribution functions.
The designer who does not know the agent's abilities but only the distribution of their abilities imposes an ability threshold in every stage according to the agent who arrives in that stage. We demonstrate that the ratio between the ability thresholds of both stages depends …rst on the agents' distributions of types and second on the timing of play. Thus, while when agents are ex-ante symmetric the ability threshold levels are necessarily decreasing along the stages, in our model when the agents are ex-ante asymmetric they may increase. We also provided su¢ cient conditions such that the designer would prefer that the stronger agent will arrive …rst and the weaker one later. We believe that this result holds even for much weaker conditions than our su¢ cient conditions. In this paper, for simplicity, we considered a two-agent model but most of our results about the ratio of the ability thresholds can be easily generalized to a model with any number of agents. On the other hand, a generalization of our results about the optimal order of agents to sequential search models with any number of agents would most likely be quite complex to undertake.
